Abstract. We present a completeness result for a logical system which combines stit logic and justification logic in order to represent proving activity of the agents. This logic is interpreted over the semantics introduced in [7] . We define a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for this logic and show that this system is strongly complete relative to the intended semantics.
Introduction
Stit logic of justification announcements (JA-STIT) is a formalism for reasoning about proving activity of agents which combines expressive powers of stit logic (see e.g. [4] ) with those of justification logic (see e.g. [2] ). The two latter logics provide for the pure agency side and the pure proof ontology side of the proving activity, respectively, so that it is assumed that doing something is in effect seeing to it that something is the case, and that every actual proof can be understood as a realization of some proof polynomial from justification logic. The only missing element in this picture is then the link between the two components, i.e. how agents can see to it that a proof is realized. Such a realization may come in different forms, researchers may, for example, exchange emails or put the proofs they have found on a common whiteboard. In stit logic of justification announcements this rather common situation is idealized in that only public proving activity of agents is taken into account. In other words, taking up the whiteboard metaphor, the agents in question can only participate in proving activity by putting their proofs on the common whiteboard for everyone to see, and not by sending one another private messages or scribbling in their private notebooks. Therefore, the only type of communicative actions within this idealized community turns out to be a variant of public announcement of proof polynomials. This idealization lends the medium of public announcement, i.e. the metaphorical community whiteboard, the status of the only interface between the agentive efforts of the community and the abstract realm of proofs. Proof polynomials may end up being presented on the whiteboard, and the agents may see to it that this or that particular proof is presented there. The whiteboard itself is also idealized in that we assume that there is always enough space on it to put up another proof, and that every proof, once on the whiteboard, remains there forever.
The language of stit logic of justification announcements then combines the full sets of justification and stit modalities with a new modality Et which says that the proof polynomial t is presented to the community (or, to continue with the whiteboard metaphor, that t is put on the community whiteboard). In this way arises a non-trivial and expressively rich logic, and the main purpose of the present paper is to provide a strongly complete axiomatization for this logic.
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define the language and the semantics of the logic at hand. We also briefly characterize its relations with other formalisms combining the resources of justification logic and stit logic, studied in the earlier publications, namely, in [7] and [8] . We mention that the finite model property fails for the stit logic of justification announcements in a rather strong form, and show that the language of JA-STIT is expressive enough to distinguish between the full class of justification stit models and the class of justification stit models based on discrete time.
The system of axioms for JA-STIT is then presented in Section 3. We immediately show this system to be sound w.r.t. the semantics introduced in Section 2, and deduce some theorems in the system. Section 4 then contains the bulk of technical work necessary for the proof of completeness of the presented axiomatization w.r.t. the class of normal jstit models. It gives a stepwise construction and adequacy check for all the numerous components of the canonical model and ends with a proof of a truth lemma. Section 5 then gives a concise proof of the completeness result and draws some quick corollaries including the compactness property.
Then follows Section 6, giving some conclusions and drafting directions for future work.
In what follows we will be assuming, due to space limitations, a basic acquaintance with both stit logic and justification logic. We recommend to peruse [5, Ch. 2] for a quick introduction to the basics of stit logic, and [1] for the same w.r.t. justification logic.
non-trivial matter. One obvious reason for this is the difference between the underlying action logics (stit logic in the case at hand vs. dynamic logic of PAL). Another reason is that we are studying public announcements of a special type of objects (i.e. proof polynomials) in a multi-agent setting, whereas in PAL sentence announcements are studied, and these sentence announcements are not tied to a particular agent. Moreover, in JA-STIT public announcements are not reducible to static formulas and are actually intended to be that way.
Basic definitions and notation

Preliminaries
We fix some preliminaries. First, we choose a finite set Ag disjoint from all the other sets to be defined below. Individual agents from this set will be denoted by letters i and j. Then we fix countably infinite sets P V ar of proof variables (denoted by x, y, z, w, u) and P Const of proof constants (denoted by a, b, c, d). When needed, subscripts and superscripts will be used with the above notations or any other notations to be introduced in this paper. Set P ol of proof polynomials is then defined by the following BNF:
t := x | c | s + t | s × t |!t, with x ∈ P V ar, c ∈ P Const, and s, t ranging over elements of P ol. In the above definition, + stands for the sum of proofs, × denotes application of its left argument to the right one, and ! denotes the so-called proof-checker, so that !t checks the correctness of proof t.
In order to define the set F orm of formulas, we fix a countably infinite set V ar of propositional variables to be denoted by letters p, q, r, s. Formulas themselves will be denoted by letters A, B, C, D, and the definition of F orm is supplied by the following BNF:
with p ∈ V ar, j ∈ Ag and t ∈ P ol.
It is clear from the above definition of F orm that we are considering a version of modal propositional language. As for the informal interpretations of modalities, [j] A is the so-called cstit action modality and ✷ is the historical necessity modality; both modailities are borrowed from stit logic. The next two modailities, KA and t:A, come from justification logic and the latter is interpreted as "t proves A", whereas the former is the strong epistemic modality "A is known".
We assume ✸ as notation for the dual modality of ✷. As usual, ω will denote the set of natural numbers including 0, ordered in the natural way.
Semantics
For the language at hand, we assume the following semantics. A justification stit (or jstit, for short) model is a structure M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, R e , E, V such that:
1. T ree is a non-empty set. Elements of T ree are called moments.
2.
✂ is a partial order on T ree for which a temporal interpretation is assumed. We will also freely use notations like ☎, ✁, and ✄ to denote the inverse relation and the irreflexive companions. 2 A more common notation ≤ is not convenient for us since we also widely use ≤ in this paper to denote the natural order relation between elements of ω.
3. Hist(M) is a set of maximal ✂-chains in T ree. Since Hist(M) is completely determined by T ree and ✂, it is not included into the model structure as a separate component. Elements of Hist(M) are called histories. The set of histories containing a given moment m will be denoted H m . The following set:
called the set of moment-history pairs, will be used to evaluate the elements of F orm.
4.
Choice is a function mapping T ree × Agent into 2
2
Hist in such a way that for any given j ∈ Agent and m ∈ T ree we have as Choice(m, j) (to be denoted as Choice 
5.
Act is a function mapping M H(M) into 2 P ol .
6. R and R e are two pre-order on T ree giving two versions of epistemic accessibility relation. They are assumed to be connected by inclusion R ⊆ R e .
7. E is a function mapping T ree × P ol into 2 F orm .
8. V is the evaluation function, mapping the set V ar into 2
However, not all structures of the above described type are admitted as jstit models. A number of additional restrictions needs to be satisfied. More precisely, we assume satisfaction of the following constraints:
Historical connection:
(∀m, m 1 ∈ T ree)(∃m 2 ∈ T ree)(m 2 ✂ m ∧ m 2 ✂ m 1 ).
No backward branching:
3. No choice between undivided histories:
for every j ∈ Agent.
4. Independence of agents:
5. Monotonicity of evidence:
6. Evidence closure properties. For arbitrary m ∈ T ree, s, t ∈ P ol and A, B ∈ F orm it is assumed that:
7. Expansion of presented proofs:
No new proofs guaranteed:
(∀m ∈ T ree)(
9. Presenting a new proof makes histories divide:
10. Future always matters:
11. Presented proofs are epistemically transparent:
We offer some intuitive explanation for the above defined notion of jstit model. Jstit models were introduced in [7] for the logics based on the combination of stit and justification modalities. Due to space limitations, we only explain the intuitions behind jstit models very briefly, and we urge the reader to consult [7, Section 3] for a more comprehensive explanations, whenever needed.
The components like T ree, ✂, Choice and V are inherited from stit logic, whereas R, R e , and E come from justification logic. The only new component is the function Act, which gives out, to take up the whiteboard metaphor, the current state of this whiteboard at any given moment under any given history. When interpreting Act, we draw on the classical stit distinction between dynamic (agentive) and static (momentdeterminate) entities, assuming that the presence of a given proof polynomial t on the community whiteboard only becomes an accomplished fact at m when t is present in Act(m, h) for every h ∈ H m . On the other hand, if t is in Act(m, h) only for some h ∈ H m this means that t is rather in a dynamic state of being presented, rather than being present, to the community.
The numbered list of semantical constraints above then just builds on these intuitions. Constraints 1-4 are borrowed from stit logic, constraints 5 and 6 are inherited from justification logic. Constraint 7 just says that nothing gets erased from the whiteboard, constraint 8 says a new proof cannot spring into existence as a static (i.e. moment-determinate) feature of the environment out of nothing, but rather has to come as a result (or a by-product) of a previous activity. Constraint 9 is just a corollary to constraint 3 in the richer environment of jstit models, constraint 10 says that the possible future of the given moment is always epistemically relevant in this moment, and constraint 11 says that the community immediately knows everything that has firmly made its way onto the whiteboard.
For the members of F orm, we will assume the following inductively defined satisfaction relation. For every jstit model M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, R e , E, V and for every (m, h) ∈ M H(M) we stipulate that:
In the above clauses we assume that p ∈ V ar; we also assume standard clauses for the Boolean connectives. We further assume standard definitions for satisfiability and validity of formulas and sets of formulas in the presented semantics. One can in principle simplify the above semantics by introducing the additional constraint that R e ⊆ R. This leads to a collapse of the two epistemic accessibility relation into one. Therefore, we will call jstit models satisfying R e ⊆ R unirelational jstit models. It is known that such a simplification in the context of pure justification logic does not affect the set of theorems (see, e.g. [6] and [2, Comment 6.5]), and we will show that this is also the case within the more expressive environment of JA-STIT. In fact, the canonical model to be constructed in our completeness is unirelational, therefore, we offer some comments as to the simplifications of semantics available in the unirelational setting.
We observe that one can equivalently define a unirelational jstit model as a structure M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, E, V satisfying all the constraints for the jstit models, except that in the numbered constraints one substitutes R for R e . Also, in the context of unirelational jstit models, it is possible to simplify the satisfation clause for t:A as follows:
M, m, h |= t:A ⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&M, m, h |= KA.
Before we move on, we briefly clarify the relation of JA-STIT to other logics based on the combination of justification and stit modalities to be found in the existing literature. Firstly, JA-STIT is a fragment of the logic introduced in [8] under the name 'logic of E-notions'. The difference is that in the logic of E-notions an implicit version of Et-modality is also present. This implicit version comes in the format EA, where A ∈ F orm and has the meaning that some proof of A is presented to the community. The satisfaction clause for this additional modality looks as follows:
It is pretty obvious that EA is not definable using expressive powers of JA-STIT, so that JA-STIT is a proper fragment of the logic of E-notions.
Another natural logic featuring the full set of justification and stit modalities is the basic jstit logic introduced in [7] and further explored in [8] . This logic is also interpreted over the class of jstit models which facilitates the comparison. In basic jstit logic justification and stit modalities are augmented with the following set of four modalities representing different modes of proving activity:
Notation
Informal interpretation P rove(j, A)
Agent j proves A P rove(j, t, A) Agent j proves A by t P roven(A)
A has been proven P roven(t, A) A has been proven by t
In the above table, A ∈ F orm, t ∈ P ol and j ∈ Ag are designating the type and arrangement of arguments for the listed modalities. It turns out that two of these four modalities, namely P rove(j, t, A) and P roven(t, A) are definable in JA-STIT. These modalities are interpreted by the following satisfaction clauses:
It is easy to see then that these modalities can be defined within JA-STIT as follows:
However, as for the other two modalities of the basic jstit logic, their indefinability within JA-STIT is rather obvious and can be easily shown. On the other hand, Et-modality itself does not seem to be definable within the basic jstit logic. Given all these facts, the relation between JA-STIT and the basic jstit logic can be described as follows. The fragment of basic jstit logic given by the two modalities {P rove(j, t, A), P roven(t, A)} plus the set of stit and justification modalities can be faithfully recovered within JA-STIT. This is a maximal fragment of basic jstit logic that can be recovered within JA-STIT, and JA-STIT itself is a proper extension of this fragment in terms of expressive power. In the other direction, Et-modality cannot be recovered within basic jstit logic, which means that only those fragments of JA-STIT can be recovered within basic jstit logic which are confined to combinations of modalities borrowed directly from justification and stit logics.
Concluding remarks
Before we start with the task of axiomatizing JA-STIT, we briefly mention some facts about its expressive powers which are relevant to our chosen format of completeness proof. Firstly, it is worth noting that under the presented semantics some satisfiable formulas cannot be satisfied over finite models, or even over infinite models where all histories are finite. The argument for this is the same as in implicit fragment of basic jstit logic, for which this claim was proved in [9] using K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p) as an example of a formula which is satisfiable over jstit models but not over jstit models with finite histories. This already rules out some methods of proving completeness like filtration method.
Secondly, it turns out that, even though JA-STIT is not, strictly speaking, a temporal logic, it can still tell something about the structure of histories generated in a given jstit model. Indeed, let us define that a jstit model M is based on discrete time iff every chain in Hist(M) is isomorphic to an initial segment of ω, the set of natural numbers. Then it can be shown that: Proposition 1. The set of JA-STIT formulas valid over the class of (unirelational) jstit models is a proper subset of the set of JA-STIT formulas valid over the class of (unirelational) jstit models based on discrete time.
Proof. We clearly have the subset relation. As for the properness part, consider the formula K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey) → (¬Ex ∨ Ey) with x, y ∈ P V ar. We show that this formula is not valid over the class of all unirelational jstit models (hence not valid over the class of all jstit models either). Consider the following unirelational model M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, E, V for the community of a single agent j:
• T ree = {a, b} ∪ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1};
• R = ✂;
• E(m, t) = F orm, for all m ∈ T ree and t ∈ P ol.
• V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ V ar.
It is straightforward to see that the above-defined components of M satisfy all the constraints imposed on normal jstit models except possibly those involving Act. Before we go on and define Act, let us pause a bit and reflect on the structure of histories in the model M that is being defined. We only have two histories in it, one is h 1 = (a, b) and the other is h 2 = {a} ∪ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1}. So we define:
• Act(a, h 2 ) = {x};
• Act(a, h 1 ) = Act(b, h 1 ) = ∅;
• Act(r, h 2 ) = {x, y} for all r ∈ R ∩ T ree.
Again, most of the constraints on jstit models are now easily seen to be satisfied. 3 The no new proofs guaranteed constraint is perhaps less straightforward, so we consider it in some detail. We have, on the one hand, Act(a, h 1 ) ∩ Act(a, h 2 ) = Act(b, h 1 ) = ∅, so neither a, nor b can falsify the constraint. The only remaining option is that m ∈ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1}, say m = r. But then the only history passing through r is h 2 and we have, on the other hand, r 2 ∈ T ree, r 2 < r, and Act( r 2 , h 2 ) = Act(r, h 2 ) so that the no new proofs guaranteed constraint is again verified. Now, consider a ∈ T ree. The set of a's epistemic alternatives is T ree itself. We have M, a, h 1 |= Ex, therefore M, a, h 2 |= ¬✷Ex, whence M, a, h 2 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey. We also have, of course, that M, a, h 1 |= ¬✷Ex and M, a, h 1 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey. In the same way, we see that M, b, h 1 |= ¬✷Ex and M, b, h 1 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey Moreover, if r is a real number strictly between 0 and 1, then M, r, h 2 |= Ex, and, since h 2 is the only history passing through r, we get also M, r, h 2 |= ✷Ex, and, further, M, r, h 2 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey. Thus the formula ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey holds at every epistemic alternative of a for every history passing through this alternative. This means that M, a, h 2 |= K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey). Besides, we have that M, a, h 2 |= Ex ∧ ¬Ey, so that the pair (a, h 2 ) falsifies the formula K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey) → (¬Ex ∨ Ey) in M.
On the other hand, K(¬✷Ex∨✷Ey) → (¬Ex∨Ey) is valid in the class of jstit models based on discrete time (hence also over unirelational jstit models based on discrete time). In order to show this, we will assume its invalidity and obtain a contradiction. Indeed, let M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, R e , E, V be a jstit model based on discrete time such that M, m, h |= K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey) → (¬Ex ∨ Ey).
Then we will have both
and
By (1), we know that:
and, by (2) , it follows that: M, m, h |= ¬✷Ey.
Therefore, we know by (3) that M, m, h |= ¬✷Ex, so that there is an h ′ ∈ H m such that M, m, h ′ |= ¬Ex. In view of (2), we must have h = h ′ , so H m cannot be a singleton. Since histories are defined as maximal chains of moments, we know that H m ′ is always a singleton when m ′ ∈ T ree is ✂-maximal. Therefore m cannot be ✂-maximal and thus m cannot be the ✂-last moment along h. Since M is based on discrete time, consider embedding f of h into an initial segment of ω. Suppose that f (m) = n. Since m is not the ✂-last moment along h, there must be an m ′ ∈ h such that f (m ′ ) = n + 1. Since f is an embedding, this means that m ✁ m ′ and for no m ′′ ∈ T ree it is true that m ✁ m ′′ ✁ m ′ . By the future always matters constraint, we know that R(m, m ′ ), therefore, by (1) we must have:
On the other hand, let g ∈ H m ′ be arbitrary. Then, by the absence of backward branching, g ∈ H m , and, moreover, g is undivided from h at m. Therefore, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, we must have Act(m, g) = Act(m, h).
By (2) we know that x ∈ Act(m, h), which means that also x ∈ Act(m, g). Since g ∈ H m ′ was chosen arbitrarily, the latter means that x ∈ g∈H m ′ (Act(m, g)), and, by the expansion of presented proofs constraint, x ∈ g∈H m ′ (Act(m ′ , g)). This, in turn, yields that:
whence, in view of (5), it follows that
The latter means that y ∈ g∈H m ′ (Act(m ′ , g)), and by the no new proofs guaranteed constraint, it follows that for some g ∈ H m ′ and some
was chosen as the immediate ✁-successor of m along h. The latter means, by the expansion of presented proofs, that y ∈ Act(m, g). Since g is undivided from h at m, this means, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, that Act(m, g) = Act(m, h) and, further, that y ∈ Act(m, h). The latter is in obvious contradiction with (2).
Proposition 1 shows that if one wants to prove the completeness theorem for JA-STIT by constructing a canonical model, the histories in this model both have to be allowed to be infinite and have to have a rather involved order structure. This shows that the canonical model used in the completeness proof that follows below, is not likely to allow for any major simplifications.
Axiomatic system and soundness
We consider the Hilbert-style axiomatic system Σ with the following set of axiomatic schemes:
A full set of axioms for classical propositional logic (A0) S5 axioms for ✷ and [j] for every j ∈ Agent (A1)
The assumption is that in (A3) j 1 , . . . , j n are pairwise different. To this set of axiom schemes we add the following rules of inference:
From A infer KA; (R2) If A is an instance of (A0)-(A9) and c ∈ P Const, then infer c:A; (R3)
Rule (R3) is obviously not satisfied over the general class of jstit models. However, we introduce it as an inheritance of justification logic with its constant specifications. Rule (R3) gives just one example of such constant specification, but it serves as a general case in our situation, since the form of our completeness proof allows for a straightforward adaptation to any other variant of constant specification allowed for in justification logic, including the empty constant specification which would correspond to omitting (R3) altogether. On the other hand, should we take the empty constant specification as our default example, it would not be clear how to adapt the proof to accommodate non-empty constant specification, since completeness proof for the empty specification allows for quite a bit of shortcuts, which are not available in the more general case. We postpone a more general discussion of constant specifications till Section 5, confining ourselves in the meantime to the particular case given by (R3). In order to adapt the scope of our completeness result to the presence of (R3), we call a (unirelational) jstit model M normal iff the following condition is satisfied:
Our goal is now to obtain a strong completeness theorem for Σ w.r.t. the class of normal models. Establishing soundness mostly reduces to a routine check that every axiom is valid and that rules preserve validity. We treat the less obvious cases in some detail: Theorem 1. Every instance of (A0)-(A9) is valid over the class of normal jstit models. Every application of rules (R1)-(R4) to formulas which are valid over the class of normal jstit models yields a formula which is valid over the class of normal jstit models.
Proof. First, note that if M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, R e , E, V is a normal jstit model, then T ree, ✂, Choice, V is a model of stit logic. Therefore, axioms (A0)-(A3), which were copy-pasted from the standard axiomatization of dstit logic 4 must be valid. Second, note that if M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, R e , E, V is a normal jstit model, then M = T ree, R, R e , E, V is what is called in [2, Section 6] a justification model with the form of constant specification defined by (R3) 5 . This means that also all of the (A4)-(A7) must be valid, whereas (R1)-(R3) must preserve validity, given that all these parts of our axiomatic system were borrowed from the standard axiomatization of justification logic . The validity of other parts of Σ will be motivated below in some detail. In what follows, M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, R e , E, V will always stand for an arbitrary normal jstit model, and (m, h) for an arbitrary element of M H(M).
As for (A8), assume for reductio that M, m, h |= KA∧✸K✸¬A. Then M, m, h |= KA and also M, m, h ′ |= K✸¬A for some h ′ ∈ H m . By reflexivity of R, it follows that ✸¬A will be satisfied at (m, h) in M. The latter means that, for some h ′′ ∈ H m , A must fail at (m, h ′′ ) and therefore, again by reflexivity of R, KA must fail at (m, h) in M, a contradiction.
We consider next (A9). If ✷Et is true at (m, h) in M, then, by definition, t ∈ h∈Hm Act(m, h). Now, if m ′ ∈ T ree is such that R(m, m ′ ), then, by epistemic transparency of presented proofs constraint, we must have t ∈ h ′ ∈H m ′ Act(m ′ , h ′ ) so that for every g ∈ H m ′ we will have M, m ′ , g |= ✷Et. Therefore, we must have M, m, h |= K✷Et as well.
It only remains to show that (R4) preserves validity over normal jstit models. Assume that KA → (¬✷Et 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Et n ) is valid over normal jstit models, and assume also that we have:
Whence, by the assumed validity, we know that also:
therefore, we can choose a natural k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n and M, m, h |= ¬✷Et k . The latter, in turn, means that for some h ′ ∈ H m we have that:
Comparison between (8) and (9) shows that h = h ′ . Therefore, we know that H m is not a singleton, which means that m cannot be a ✂-maximal moment in T ree and we can choose an m ′ ∈ T ree such that h ∈ H m ′ and m ′ ✄ m. By (8) we know that t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Act(m, h) and we know that every g ∈ H m ′ is undivided from h at m. Therefore, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, we get that t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Act(m, g) for all g ∈ H m ′ , hence, by the expansion of presented proofs constraint, we get that t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ g∈H m ′ Act(m ′ , g). This means that we have, on the one hand:
And, on the other, hand, we know that by the future always matters constraint, we have R(m, m ′ ), which also means that, by (8) we get that:
Taken together, (10) and (11) contradict the validity of KA → (¬✷Et 1 ∨, . . . , ∨¬✷Et n ).
We then define a proof in Σ as a finite sequence of formulas such that every formula in it is either an axiom or is obtained from earlier elements of the sequence by one of inference rules. A proof is a proof of its last formula. If an A ∈ F orm is provable in our system, we will write ⊢ Σ A. However, since we will not be considering any axiomatic systems different from Σ until Section 5, the subscript to ⊢ will be suppressed. Similarly, we will simply speak of consistency and inconsistency meaning consistency and inconsistency relative to Σ.
The presence of (R4) in Σ complicates the issue of finding the right notion of an inference from premises and the right format for Deduction Theorem. Therefore, we cannot just define that a set Γ ⊆ F orm is inconsistent iff ⊥ is derivable from Γ. We have to take a little detour and say that Γ ⊆ F orm is inconsistent iff for some A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ Γ we have ⊢ (A 1 ∧ . . . ∧ A n ) → ⊥, and we say that Γ is consistent iff it is not inconsistent. Γ is maxiconsistent iff it is consistent and no consistent subset of F orm properly extends Γ.
Even with this slightly non-standard definition of inconsistency, we can still do many familiar things, e.g. extend consistent sets with new formulas and eventually make them maxiconsistent. More precisely, the following lemma holds: Lemma 1. Let Γ ⊆ F orm be consistent, and let A, B ∈ F orm. Then:
1. There exists a ∆ ⊆ F orm such that ∆ is maxiconsistent and Γ ⊆ ∆.
2. If Γ is maxiconsistent, then exactly one element of {A, ¬A} is in Γ.
4. If Γ is maxiconsistent and A, (A → B) ∈ Γ, then B ∈ Γ.
5. If Γ is maxiconsistent, then A ∧ B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ).
Proof. (Part 1) Just as in the standard case, we enumerate the elements of F orm as A 1 , . . . , A n , . . . and form the sequence of sets Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , . . . , such that Γ 1 := Γ and for every natural i ≥ 1:
We now define ∆ := i≥1 Γ i . Of course, we have Γ ⊆ ∆, and, moreover, ∆ is maxiconsistent. To see this, note that for every i ≥ 1 the set Γ i is consistent by construction. Now, if ∆ is inconsistent, then there must be a valid implication from a finite conjunction of formulas in ∆ to ⊥. These formulas must be mentioned in our numeration of F orm so that the valid implication in question can presented as ⊢ (A i1 ∧. . .∧A in ) → ⊥ for appropriate natural i 1 , . . . , i n . Since all of A i1 , . . . , A in are in ∆, we must have, by the construction of Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , . . . , that A i1 , . . . , A in ∈ Γ max(i1,...,in) . But then this latter set must be inconsistent which contradicts our construction.
Further, if some consistent Ξ ⊆ F orm is such that ∆ ⊂ Ξ, then let A n ∈ Ξ \ ∆. We must have then Γ n ∪ {A n } inconsistent, but we also have Γ n ∪ {A n } ⊆ Ξ, which implies inconsistency of Ξ, in contradiction to our assumptions. Therefore, ∆ is not only consistent, but also maxiconsistent.
(Part 2) We cannot have both A and ¬A in Γ, since we have, of course, ⊢ (A∧¬A) → ⊥. If, on the other hand, neither A, nor ¬A is in Γ, then both Γ ∪ {A} and Γ ∪ {¬A} must be inconsistent, so that for some B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ Γ we will have:
whereas for some C 1 , . . . , C k ∈ Γ we will have:
whence we get, using (A0) and (R1):
and further:
so that Γ turns out to be inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. (Part 3) Assume (A ∨ B) ∈ Γ. If neither A nor B are in Γ, then, by Part 2, both ¬A and ¬B are in Γ. Using (A0) and (R1) we get that:
showing that Γ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. In the other direction, if, say A ∈ Γ and (A ∨ B) / ∈ Γ, then, by Part 2, we must have ¬(A ∨ B) ∈ Γ. Using (A0) and (R1) we get that:
showing, again, that Γ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. The case when B ∈ Γ is similar. Parts 4 and 5 are similar to Part 3.
We are now prepared to formulate our main result:
The rest of the paper is mainly concerned with proving Theorem 2. One part of it we have, of course, right away, as a consequence of Theorem 1:
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ F orm be satisfiable in a normal jstit model so that we have, say M, m, h |= Γ for some (m, h) ∈ M H(M). If Γ were inconsistent this would mean that for some A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ Γ we would have
whence clearly M, m, h |= ⊥, which is impossible. Therefore, Γ must be consistent. Further, if Γ ⊆ F orm is satisfiable in a normal unirelational jstit model, then Γ must be satisfiable in a normal jstit model. Hence Γ must be consistent by the above reasoning.
Before we move further, we mention some theorems in the above axiom system to be used later in the proof of the main result:
Lemma 2. The following holds for every A ∈ F orm, t ∈ P ol, x ∈ P V ar, and j ∈ Ag:
Proof. (Part 1) We have:
Our theorem follows then by transitivity of implication.
(Part 2). By S5 properties of ✷ and S4 properties of K, we clearly have ⊢ ✷K✷A → ✷KA. Part 2 follows then by (A8) and transitivity of implication.
The canonical model
The main aim of the present section is to prove the inverse of Corollary 1. The method used is a variant of the canonical model technique, but, due to the complexity of the case, we do not define our model in one full sweep. Rather, we proceed piecewise, defining elements of the model one by one, and checking the relevant constraints as soon, as we have got enough parts of the model in place. The last subsection proves the truth lemma for the defined model. As we have already indicated, the model to be built will be a normal unirelational jstit model, so that R e will be omitted, or, equivalently, assumed to coincide with R.
The ultimate building blocks of M we will call elements. Before going on with the definition of M, we define what these elements are and explore some of their properties. Definition 1. An element is a sequence of the form (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) for some n ∈ ω with n ≥ 1 such that:
• For every k ≤ n, Γ k is maxiconsistent;
• For every k < n, for all A ∈ F orm, if KA ∈ Γ k , then KA ∈ Γ k+1 ;
• For every k < n, for all t ∈ P ol, if Et ∈ Γ k , then ✷Et ∈ Γ k+1 .
We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Whenever (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) is an element, there exists a Γ n+1 ⊆ F orm such that the sequence (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n+1 ) is also an element.
Proof. Assume (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) is an element and consider the following set:
We show that ∆ is consistent. Of course, the set {KA | KA ∈ Γ n } is consistent since it is a subset of Γ n and the latter is assumed to be consistent. Further, if ∆ is inconsistent, then, wlog, for some KB 1 , . . . , KB r , Et 1 , . . . , Et u ∈ Γ n we will have:
whence, by (A7):
and further, by (R4):
The latter formula shows that Γ n is inconsistent which contradicts the assumption that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) is an element.
Therefore, ∆ must be consistent, and, by Lemma 1.1, it is also extendable to a maxiconsistent Γ n+1 . By the choice of ∆, this means that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , Γ n+1 ) must be an element.
The structure of elements will be important in what follows. If ξ = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) is an element and an element τ is of the form (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k ) with k < n, we say that τ is a proper initial segment of ξ. Moreover, if k = n − 1, then τ is the greatest proper initial segment of ξ. We define n to be the length of ξ. Furthermore, we define that Γ n is the end element of ξ and write Γ n = end(ξ).
We now define the canonical model using elements as our building blocks. We start by defining the following relation ≡:
It is routine to check that ≡ is an equivalence relation given that ✷ is an S5 modality. The notation [(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n )] ≡ will denote the ≡-equivalence class generated by (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ). Since all the elements inside a given ≡-equvalence class are of the same length, we may extend the notion of length to these classes setting that the length of [(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n )] ≡ also equals n.
We now proceed to definitions of components for the canonical model.
T ree, ≤, and Hist(M)
The first two elements of the canonical model M are as follows:
Thus the elements of T ree, with the exception of the special moment †, are ≡-equivalence classes of elements coupled with natural numbers. Such moments we will call standard moments, and the left projection of a standard moment m we will call its core (and write − → m), while the right projection of such moment we will call its height (and write |m|). In this way, we get the equality m = ( − → m, |m|) for every standard m ∈ T ree. We further define that the length of a standard moment m is the length of its core. For the sake of completeness, we extend the above notions to † setting both length and height of this moment to 0 and defining that − → † = †.
• We set that (∀m ∈ T ree \ { †})( † ✁ m&¬m ✁ †). We further set that for any two standard moments m and m ′ , we have that m ✁ m ′ iff either (1) there exists a
The relation ✂ is then defined as the reflexive companion to ✁.
Before we move on to the choice-and justifications-related components, let us pause to check that the restraints imposed by our semantics on T ree and ✂ are satisfied:
Lemma 4. The relation ✂, as defined above, is a partial order on T ree, which satisfies both historical connection and no backward branching constraints. Before we move on to the other components of the canonical model M to be defined in this section, we look into the structure of Hist(M) as induced by the above-defined T ree and ✂. We start by defining a basic sequence of elements. A basic sequence of elements is a set of elements of the form {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n , . . . , } such that for every n ≥ 1:
• ξ n is of length n;
• ξ n is the greatest proper initial segment of ξ n+1 .
Basic sequences will be denoted by capital Latin letters S, T , and U with subscripts and superscripts when needed. Every given basic sequence S induces the following [S] ⊆ T ree:
It is immediate that every basic sequence S induces a unique [S] ⊆ T ree in this way. It is, perhaps, less immediate that the mapping S → [S] is injective:
Lemma 5. Let S, T be basic sequences of elements. Then:
Proof. Assume that S = {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n , . . . , } and that T = {τ 1 , . . . , τ n , . . . , }. We will show that ξ n = τ n for arbitrary n ∈ ω. 
] ≡ and ξ n+1 ≡ τ n+1 . Therefore, ξ n+1 and τ n+1 must share the greatest proper initial segment which is ξ n for ξ n+1 and τ n for τ n+1 . Since this segment is the same for ξ n+1 and τ n+1 , it follows that ξ n = τ n .
We now move on to a characterization of Hist(M), first proving a number of technical lemmas: Lemma 6. If h ∈ Hist(M) and k ∈ ω, then h contains at least one moment of length exceeding k.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, and let k ∈ ω be such that every moment in h has length at most k. We may assume that this is the least such k so that some elements of the length k are actually in h. We have to consider two cases then:
} is a ✂-chain properly extending h, which contradicts the maximality of h.
Case 2. k > 0. Then take an arbitrary moment m of the length k in h, say m = ([(Γ 1 , . . . ,
and we are done. If m ✁ m ′ , then we cannot have any ξ ∈ − → m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element in − → m ′ since every such ξ is of length k and this would mean that elements in − → m ′ must have a length greater than k, which contradicts the choice of m ′ . Therefore, we must
Now, using Lemma 3, we can choose a Γ k+1 ⊆ F orm such that ( 
Hence h ∪ {m ′′ } is a ✂-chain properly extending h, which, again, contradicts the maximality of h.
Lemma 7.
If h ∈ Hist(M) and k ∈ ω, then h contains at least one moment of the length k.
Proof. Take an arbitrary k ∈ ω. If k = 0, then the lemma holds, since †, being the ✂-least moment in T ree, is of course in h. Assume that k > 0. There are two cases to consider then. Case 1. For every n + 1 ∈ ω it is true that whenever there is a moment of the length n + 1 in h, then there is also a moment of length n in h. Then our lemma follows from Lemma 6. Case 2. There is an n + 1 ∈ ω such that some m ∈ T ree of the length n + 1 is in h, but there are no moments of the length n in h. Then consider m, say It follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 that core(h) contains exactly one moment core of the length n for every n ∈ ω. Therefore, core(h) has the form { †, α 1 , . . . , α n , . . . , }, where every α k is an equivalence class of elements of length k. We now claim that if k ≥ 2, then there is a ξ k−1 ∈ α k−1 such that ξ k−1 is a proper initial segment of every element in α k . Indeed, we know that for some r, r ′ ∈ ω the moments (α k−1 , r), (α k , r ′ ) are in h. We cannot have (α k , r ′ ) ✂ (α k−1 , r) since the length of α k−1 is strictly less than the length of α k . Therefore, since h is a chain, we must have (α k−1 , r) ✁ (α k , r ′ ), and, again by length considerations, there must be a ξ k−1 ∈ α k−1 such that ξ k−1 is a proper initial segment of every element in α k .
So we choose such a ξ k−1 ∈ α k−1 for every k ≥ 2. In this way we obtain the sequence S = {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n , . . . , } with the following properties:
2. For all k ≥ 1, ξ k is a proper initial segment of every element in α k+1 . Now, for given k ≥ 1, since ξ k is a proper initial segment of every element in α k+1 , then ξ k is also a proper initial segment of ξ k+1 . And since the lengths of ξ k and ξ k+1 are k and k + 1, respectively, then ξ k is the greatest proper initial segment of ξ k+1 . This means that the sequence S = {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n , . . . , } is in fact a basic sequence. We now show that [S] ⊆ h and since, by Part 1, [S] is itself a history, this will mean that [S] = h, and that, given that h was chosen arbitrarily, we will be done. Indeed, assume that m ∈ [S]. If m = †, then of course m ∈ h by maximality of h, since † is the ✂-least element in T ree. Therefore, assume that m is standard, say m = ([ξ n ] ≡ , k). Take an arbitrary m ′ ∈ h. We will show that we either have m ✂ m ′ or m ′ ✂ m. In the case when m ′ = † we trivially get m ′ ✁ m so we assume that m ′ is standard so that for some appropriate k ′ , n ′ ∈ ω we must have
. We have then three cases to consider: Case 1. n ′ < n. Then ξ n ′ must be a proper initial segment of every element in [ξ n ] ≡ , and we immediately get m ′ ✁ m. Case 2. n < n ′ . This case is an inversion of Case 1, giving us that m ✁ m ′ .
Case 3. n = n ′ . Then − → m = − → m ′ and, depending on whether we have Assume that m is of the length n and that ]h[= {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n , . . . , }. Then m must be of the form ([ξ n ] ≡ , k) for some k ∈ ω, and we will also have − → m∩]h[= {ξ n }. We now define the only member of the latter singleton as the result m ⊓ h of the intersection of m and h, setting m ⊓ h = ξ n . It can be shown that for any element ξ in the core of a given standard moment m there exists an h ∈ H m such that ξ = m ⊓ h: Lemma 10. Let (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k ) be an element. Then, for every n ∈ ω there is at least
Proof. Using Lemma 3 and axiom of choice, we successively choose Γ k+1 , . . . , Γ k+l , . . . , ⊆ F orm such that all of the structures
are elements. But then, it is obvious that the set:
We offer some general remarks on what we have shown thus far. Lemma 9 shows that every history in the canonical model has a uniform order structure which can be otherwise described as follows. If L and L ′ are two linear orders then let L ⊕ L ′ be a copy of L with a copy of L ′ appended at the end, let L ⊗ L ′ be the result of replacement of every element in L ′ with a disjoint copy of L, and let L * be the inversion of L. Also, for any n ∈ ω, let (0, . . . , n) be the first n + 1 natural numbers with their natural order. Then Lemma 9 tells us that every history in the canonical model is ordered in the type of (0) ⊕ (ω * ⊗ ω). Also, note that it follows from Lemma 9 that for every ordered couple of natural numbers (k, n) with k > 0, every given history h contains exactly one moment of length k and height n. Another general observation is that histories in M can only branch off at moments of height 0, so that at moments of other heights all the histories remain undivided. This last fact does not follow from the lemmas proved thus far and we end this subsection with its proof, also establishing a couple of technical facts to be used later:
. We know that this set must be a singleton with m ′ ⊓ h as its only element, and we Proof. Since |m| > 0, we know that m = k + 1 for some k ∈ ω. Then, by Corollary 2, we must have h, h ′ ∈ H m ′ for m ′ = ( − → m, k). It remains to notice that we clearly have m ✁ m ′ .
Choice
We now define the choice structures of our canonical model:
Since for every j ∈ Ag, [j] is an S5-modality, Choice induces a partition on H m for every given m ∈ T ree. We check that the choice function verifies the relevant semantic constraints:
Lemma 12. The tuple T ree, ✂, Choice , as defined above, verifies both independence of agents and no choice between undivided histories constraints.
Proof. We first tackle no choice between undivided histories. Consider a moment m and two histories h, h ′ ∈ H m such that h and h ′ are undivided at m. Since the agents' choices are only non-vacuous at moments represented by standard moments of height 0, we may safely assume that m is such a moment. Since h and h ′ are undivided at m, this means that there is a moment m ′ such that m ✁ m ′ and m ′ is shared by h and h ′ . Hence we know that also m ′ is standard. Suppose the length of m is n and the length of m ′ is n ′ . Then n < n ′ since m is of height 0 and therefore has no equivalence classes of elements of length n above itself. Therefore, h ⊓ m is the initial segment of length n of h ⊓ m ′ , and similarly, h ′ ⊓ m is the initial segment of length n of h ′ ⊓ m ′ .
But both h ⊓ m ′ and h ′ ⊓ m ′ are, by definition, in − → m ′ , therefore, they must share the greatest proper initial segment. Hence, their initial segments of length n must coincide as well, and we must have
, then, by (A1) and maxiconsistency of end(h ⊓ m), we will have also A ∈ end(h ⊓ m) = end(h ′ ⊓ m), and thus
since Choice is a partition of H m . Consider, next, the independence of agents. Let m ∈ T ree and let f be a function on Ag such that ∀j ∈ Ag(f (j) ∈ Choice m j ). We are going to show that in this case j∈Ag f (j) = ∅. If m is not a standard moment of height 0, then this is obvious, since every agent will have a vacuous choice. We treat the case when m is a standard moment of height 0. Assume that m = ([(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n+1 )] ≡ , 0). By (A1) we know that there is a set ∆ of formulas of the form ✷A which is shared by all sets of the form end(ξ) with ξ ∈ − → m in the sense that if ξ ∈ − → m, then ✷A ∈ end(ξ) iff ✷A ∈ ∆. By the same axiom scheme and Lemma 10, we also know that for every j ∈ Ag there is set ∆ j of formulas of the form [j]A which is shared by all sets of the form end(ξ) such that ∃h(h ∈ f (j) ∧ ξ = m ⊓ h). More precisely:
We now consider the set ∆ ∪ {∆ j | j ∈ Ag} and show its consistency. Indeed, if this set is inconsistent, then, wlog, we would have a provable formula of the following form:
But then, choose for every j ∈ Ag an element ξ j ∈ − → m such that
This is possible, since we may simply choose an arbitrary h j ∈ f (j) and set ξ j := m⊓h j . Then we will have [j]A j ∈ ξ j for every j ∈ Ag. Next, consider Γ n+1 . Since m = ([(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n+1 )] ≡ , 0) and ✷ is an S5-modality, we must have:
whence, by Lemma 1.5:
and further, by (A3) and Lemma 1.4:
Also, by definition of ∆ and the fact that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n+1 ) ∈ − → m, we get successively:
then, by Lemma 1.5:
and finally, by the fact that ✷ is an S5-modality:
From (12), together with (13), it follows by S5 reasoning for ✷ that ✸⊥ ∈ Γ n+1 , so that, again by S5 properties of ✷ and Lemma 1.4, it follows that ⊥ ∈ Γ n+1 , which is in contradiction with maxiconsistency of Γ n+1 .
Hence ∆ ∪ {∆ j | j ∈ Ag} is consistent, and we can extend it to a maxiconsistent Ξ. We now consider (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , Ξ) and show that it is in fact an element. Indeed, if KA ∈ Γ n , then KA ∈ Γ n+1 by definition of an element. But then ✷KA ∈ Γ n+1 by Lemma 2.2 and maxiconsistency of Γ n+1 , whence ✷KA ∈ ∆ and, therefore, ✷KA ∈ Ξ. By (A1) and maxiconsistency of Ξ we get then KA ∈ Ξ. Similarly, if Et ∈ Γ n , then ✷Et ∈ Γ n+1 by definition of an element. But then ✷Et ∈ ∆ and, therefore, ✷Et ∈ Ξ.
Therefore, (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , Ξ) is an element and since, moreover, ∆ ⊆ Ξ, then also (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , Ξ) ∈ − → m so that m = ([(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , Ξ)] ≡ , 0). Using Lemma 10, we can choose a g ∈ H m such that g ⊓ m = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , Ξ). We also know that for every j ∈ Ag, there is a history h j ∈ f (j) such that h j ⊓m = ξ j by the choice of ξ j . Therefore, for every j ∈ Ag, Choice
, therefore, by (A1), A ∈ end(g ⊓ m). Thus we get that g ∈ j∈Ag Choice m j (h j ) = j∈Ag f (j) so that the independence of agents is verified.
R and E
We now define the justifications-related elements of our canonical model. We first define R as follows:
• R( †, m), for all m ∈ T ree.
Now, for the definition of E:
• For all t ∈ P ol: E( †, t) = {A ∈ F orm |⊢ t:A};
• For all t ∈ P ol and m = †:
(∀A ∈ F orm)(A ∈ E(m, t) ⇔ (∀ξ ∈ − → m)(t:A ∈ end(ξ))).
We start by mentioning a straightforward corollary to the above definition:
Lemma 13. For all m ∈ T ree and t ∈ P ol it is true that {A ∈ F orm |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m, t).
Proof. This holds simply by the definition of E when m = †. If m = †, then, for every ξ ∈ − → m, end(ξ) is a maxiconsistent subset of F orm and must contain every provable formula.
Note that since we know that for every instance A of one of axiom schemes in the list (A0)-(A9), it is true that ⊢ c:A for every c ∈ P Const (by (R3)), it follows, among other things, that the above-defined function E satisfies the additional normality condition on jstit models.
Lemma 14. The relation R, as defined above, is a preorder on T ree, and, together with ✂, verifies the future always matters constraint.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that R, as defined above, is a preorder on T ree, using (A7) and (A8). Let us look into why future always matters constraint is verified as well. Assume m ∈ T ree. If m = †, then it is connected to all the elements in T ree by both ✂ and R, so this moment cannot falsify the constraint. Let us assume
Now, if − → m = − → m ′ and KA ∈ Γ n , then, by maxiconsistency of Γ n and Lemma 2.2, we must also have ✷KA ∈ Γ n , which, by definition of ≡, means that KA ∈ end(ξ) for every ξ ∈ − → m = − → m ′ , and thus we get that R(m, m ′ ). The other option is that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) is a proper initial segment of every element in m ′ , so that we may assume, wlog, that m ′ = ([(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ′ )] ≡ , k ′ ) for some n ′ > n. But then take an arbitrary A ∈ F orm. If KA ∈ Γ n , then, since (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ′ ) is an element, KA ∈ Γ n ′ . Moreover, by maxiconsistency of Γ n ′ and Lemma 2.2, we will have ✷KA ∈ Γ n ′ . Now, by definition of ≡, we get KA ∈ end(τ ) for any given τ ∈ − → m ′ . It follows that, again, we have R(m, m ′ ) as desired.
We further check that the semantical constraints for E are verified:
Lemma 15. The function E, as defined above, satisfies both monotonicity of evidence and evidence closure properties.
Proof. We start with the monotonicity of evidence. Assume R(m, m ′ ) and t ∈ P ol. If m = †, then, by Lemma 13, E(m, t) = {A ∈ F orm |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m ′ , t) for any m ′ ∈ T ree. Assume, further, that m is standard. Let t ∈ P ol and A ∈ F orm be such that A ∈ E(m, t). Then, for every ξ ∈ − → m, t:A ∈ end(ξ), and, by Lemma 2.1, also Kt:A ∈ end(ξ). Therefore, by R(m, m ′ ), we get that, for every τ ∈ − → m ′ , Kt:A ∈ end(τ ), so that, by (A7) and maxiconsistency of every end(τ ), also t:A ∈ end(τ ). Therefore, A ∈ E(m ′ , t), as desired.
We turn now to the closure conditions. We verify the first two conditions, and the third one can be verified in a similar way, restricting attention to t rather than considering both s and t. Let s, t ∈ P ol. We need to consider two cases: Case 1. m = †. If A ∈ E(m, s), then ⊢ s:A. Therefore, by (A6), we must also have ⊢ (s + t):A so that A ∈ E(m, s + t). Similarly, if A ∈ E(m, t), then also A ∈ E(m, s + t) and the closure constraint (b) is verified. If, on the other hand, it is true that for some A, B ∈ F orm we have both A → B ∈ E(m, s) and A ∈ E(m, t), then, again, this means that both ⊢ s:A → B and ⊢ t:A. By (A4), it follows that ⊢ s × t:B and, therefore, also B ∈ E(m, s × t), so that the closure condition (a) is also verified.
Case 2. m = †. If A ∈ F orm and A ∈ E(m, s), then, for every ξ ∈ − → m, s:A ∈ end(ξ), and, by (A6) and maxiconsistency of every end(ξ), we get that s + t:A ∈ end(ξ). Therefore, A ∈ E(m, s + t). Similarly, if A ∈ E(m, t), then A ∈ E(m, s + t) as well, and closure condition (b) is verified.
On the other hand, if A, B ∈ F orm and we have both A → B ∈ E(m, s) and A ∈ E(m, t), then, for every ξ ∈ − → m, we have t:A, s:(A → B) ∈ end(ξ). By (A4) and maxiconsistency of every end(ξ), we get that s × t:B ∈ end(ξ), thus B ∈ E(m, s × t), and closure condition (a) is verified.
Act and V
It only remains to define Act and V for our canonical model, and we define them as follows:
• Act( †, h) = ∅ for all h ∈ Hist(M);
• Act(m, h) = {t ∈ P ol | Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h)}, if m = †, |m| = 0 and h ∈ H m ;
• Act(m, h) = {t ∈ P ol | Et ∈ g∈Hm end(m ⊓ g)}, if m = †, |m| > 0 and h ∈ H m We first draw some of the immediate consequences of the above definitions:
Lemma 16. Assume that m ∈ T ree \ { †} and t ∈ P ol. Then the following statements are true:
Proof. (Part 1). Let g ∈ H m be arbitrary. If Et ∈ h∈Hm (end(m ⊓ h)), then t ∈ Act(m, g) whatever the height of m is. Since g was chosen arbitrarily, this means that t ∈ h∈Hm (Act(m, h)). In the other direction, assume that t ∈ Act(m, g). Then, again irrespectively of the height, Et ∈ end(m⊓g). Therefore, if t ∈ h∈Hm (Act(m, h)), then Et ∈ h∈Hm (end(m ⊓ h)).
(Part 2). In the assumptions of this part, we get that:
for an arbitrary t ∈ P ol. (Part 3). We have to distinguish between two cases. If |m| = 0, then, for an arbitrary t ∈ P ol, we get that:
On the other hand, if |m| > 0, then we are done by Part 2.
We now check the remaining semantic constraints on normal jstit models:
Lemma 17. The canonical model, as defined above, satisfies the constraints as to the expransion of presented proofs, no new proofs guaranteed, presenting a new proof makes histories divide, and epistemic transparency of presented proofs.
Proof. We consider the expansion of presented proofs first. Let m ′ ✁ m and let h ∈ H m . If m ′ = †, then we have Act( †, h) = ∅, so that the expansion of presented proofs holds. If m ′ = †, then m is also standard. Consider then m ′ ⊓ h and m ⊓ h. Both these elements must be in the basic sequence ]h[, therefore, one of them must be an initial segment of another. By m ′ ✁ m we know that m ′ ⊓ h must be a proper initial segment of m⊓h. So we may assume that m ′ ⊓h = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k ) and m⊓h = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) for some appropriate Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ⊆ F orm and n > k.
is an element, we must have ✷Et ∈ Γ n . By definition of ≡, it follows that for every ξ ∈ − → m we must have that Et ∈ end(ξ). Now, if g ∈ H m , then of course m ⊓ g ∈ − → m. Therefore, we get that Et ∈ g∈Hm end(m ⊓ g), whence, by Lemma 16.1, t ∈ Act(m, h) immediately follows.
We consider next the no new proofs guaranteed constraint. Let m ∈ T ree. If m = †, then h∈Hm (Act(m, h)) = m ′ ✁m,h∈Hm (Act(m ′ , h)) = ∅ and the constraint is trivially satisfied. Assume that m = †. Then m must be of the form ([(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n )] ≡ , k) for appropriate Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ⊆ F orm and k ∈ ω. Assume that t ∈ h∈Hm (Act(m, h)). By Lemma 16.1, we get then that Et ∈ h∈Hm end(m ⊓ h).
. We clearly have m ′ ✁ m, therefore, if g ∈ H m , then also g ∈ H m ′ . In the other direction, if g ∈ H m ′ , then, by Corollary 2, we get g ∈ H m , so that the fans of histories passing through m and m ′ are identical. Further, we have − → m = − → m ′ , hence it follows from Lemma 11 that g ⊓m = g ⊓m ′ , whence end(g ⊓m) = end(g ⊓m ′ ) for every g ∈ H m = H m ′ , and, further, , h) ). Then, by Lemma 16.1, we also have Et ∈ h∈Hm (end(m ⊓ h)). Let h ∈ H m be arbitrary. We claim that under these assumptions, we must have ✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Indeed, if ✷Et / ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then consider the following set Ξ of formulas:
We claim that Ξ is consistent. Otherwise we would have
for some ✷B 1 , . . . , ✷B n ∈ end(m ⊓ h), and the latter, by S5 reasoning for ✷, would mean that
whence, by Lemma 1 and maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), ✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h) would follow, contrary to our hypothesis. But then we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent
is an element, it follows that KB ∈ Γ. By Lemma 2.2 and maxiconsistency of Γ, we further get that ✷KB ∈ Γ, whence ✷KB ∈ ∆, and, by (A1) and maxiconsistency of ∆, KB ∈ ∆. Similarly, if Es ∈ Γ k , then ✷Es ∈ Γ and further, ✷Es ∈ ∆. Once (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) is thus shown to be an element, (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , Γ) ≡ Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) follows immediately just by the choice of Ξ and the fact that ∆ extends Ξ. Therefore, (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) ∈ − → m. By Lemma 10 there is a g ∈ H m such that m ⊓ g = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆). Then ∆ = end(m ⊓ g), but we also know that ¬Et ∈ ∆. Therefore, by maxiconsistency, Et / ∈ ∆ = end(m ⊓ g). But this is in contradiction with our assumption that Et ∈ h∈Hm (m ⊓ h).
The obtained contradiction shows that ✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h), and by maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h) and (A9), this means that also K✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h). It remains to note that we have, of course m = ([m⊓h] ≡ , |m|), whence by R(m, m ′ ) we get that K✷Et ∈ τ for every τ ∈ − → m ′ . This means, by maxiconsistency of every such τ , (A1), and (A7),
, and hence, by Lemma 16.1, also t ∈ g∈H m ′ (Act(m ′ , g)), as desired.
The truth lemma
It follows from Lemmas 4-17, that our above-defined canonical model is in fact a normal unirelational jstit model. Now we need to supply a truth lemma:
Lemma 18. Let A ∈ F orm, let m ∈ T ree \ { †} be such that |m| = 0, and let h ∈ H m . Then:
Proof. As is usual, we prove the lemma by induction on the construction of A. The basis of induction with A = p ∈ V ar we have by definition of V , whereas Boolean cases for the induction step are trivial. We treat the modal cases:
By definition of ≡ and the fact that m ∈ T ree \ { †}, we must have then B ∈ end(m ⊓ h ′ ) for all h ′ ∈ H m and thus, by induction hypothesis, we obtain that M, m, h |= ✷B. If, on the other hand,
Then the set Ξ = {✷C | ✷C ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬B} must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
for some ✷C 1 , . . . , ✷C n ∈ Γ, whence, since ✷ is an S5-modality, we would get
which would mean that ✷B ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent and we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent ∆ ⊆ F orm. Of course, in this case B / ∈ ∆. We now show that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) is an element. Indeed, if for any C ∈ F orm we have that KC ∈ Γ k , then, since (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , Γ) is an element, we will have KC ∈ Γ, whence, by maxiconsistency of Γ and (A8), ✷KC ∈ Γ, and since every boxed formula from Γ is also in ∆, we get that ✷KC ∈ ∆, whence KC ∈ ∆ by maxiconsistency of ∆ and S5 reasoning for ✷. Further, if we have Et ∈ Γ k , for some t ∈ P ol, then, since (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , Γ) is an element, we will have ✷Et ∈ Γ, and since every boxed formula from Γ is also in ∆, we get that ✷Et ∈ ∆.
Once we know that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) is an element, it follows by the choice of Ξ and ∆ that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , Γ) ≡ (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆). By Lemma 10, for some h ′ ∈ H m we will have (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) = m ∩ h ′ and, therefore, ∆ = end(m ⊓ h ′ ). Since B / ∈ ∆, it follows, by induction hypothesis, that M, m, h ′ |= B, hence M, m, h |= ✷B as desired. Case 2. A = [j]B for some j ∈ Ag. Then, if [j]B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), by definition of Choice and the fact that both m = † and |m| = 0 we must have: 
is an S5-modality, we would get
which would mean that [j]B ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent and we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent ∆ ⊆ F orm. Of course, in this case B / ∈ ∆. Arguing as in Case 1, we can show that (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k , ∆) is an element. Now, if D ∈ F orm is such that ✷D ∈ Γ, then, by (A2) and maxiconsistency of Γ, we know that [j]D ∈ Γ, so that also [j]D ∈ ∆, and hence, by (A1) and maxiconsistency of ∆, D ∈ ∆. We have thus shown that:
and it follows that (Γ 1 , . . . , 
Therefore, if R(m, m ′ ) and h ′ ∈ H m ′ is arbitrary, then, of course, (h ′ ⊓m ′ ) ∈ m ′ so that KB ∈ end(h ′ ⊓ m ′ ), and, further, B ∈ end(h ′ ⊓ m ′ ) by S4 reasoning for K. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we get that M, m ′ , h ′ |= B, whence M, m, h |= KB. On the other hand, if KB / ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then consider the set Ξ = {KC | KC ∈ end(m ⊓ h)} ∪ {¬✷B}.
This set must be consistent, since otherwise we would have ⊢ (KC 1 ∧ . . . ∧ KC n ) → ✷B for some KC 1 , . . . , KC n ∈ Γ, whence, since K is an S4-modality, we would get
which would mean that K✷B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), hence, by (A1), (A7) and maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), that KB ∈ end(m ⊓ h), contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent and we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent ∆ ⊆ F orm. Of course, in this case ✷B / ∈ ∆. We will have then that (∆) is an element. So we set m ′ = ([(∆)] ≡ , 0). Assume that (∆ ′ ) ≡ (∆). Then every boxed formula from ∆ will be in ∆ ′ . In particular, whenever KC ∈ ∆, then also ✷KC ∈ ∆ and thus KC ∈ ∆ ′ , by (A1), (A8), and maxiconsistency of ∆. Therefore, whenever KC ∈ end(m ⊓ h) and τ ∈ − → m ′ = [(∆)] ≡ , we have that KC ∈ end(τ ) so that we must have R(m, m ′ ). On the other hand, since ✷B / ∈ ∆, then, by Case 1, there must be a τ ∈ m ′ such that B / ∈ end(τ ). But then, by Lemma 10, we can choose an h ′ ∈ H m ′ in such a way that τ = m ′ ⊓ h ′ , and we get that B / ∈ end(m ′ ∩ h ′ ). Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we get M, m ′ , h ′ |= B. In view of the fact that also R(m, m ′ ), this means that M, m, h |= KB as desired. Case 4. A = t:B for some t ∈ P ol. If t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then, by maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h) and Lemma 2.1, we must have ✷t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Now, if ξ ∈ − → m, then we must have, of course ξ ≡ m ⊓ h, whence t:B ∈ end(ξ). Therefore, we must have B ∈ E(m, t). Also, by maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h) and (A5), we will have KB ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Therefore, by Case 3, we will have that M, m, h |= KB and further, by B ∈ E(m, t), that M, m, h |= t:B. On the other hand, if t:B / ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then, since clearly m ⊓ h ∈ − → m, we must have B / ∈ E(m, t), whence M, m, h |= t:B. Case 5. A = Et for some t ∈ P ol. Then, given that m = † and |m| = 0, we have, simply by definition of Act, that:
Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h) ⇔ t ∈ Act(m, h) ⇔ M, m, h |= Et.
This finishes the list of the modal induction cases at hand, and thus the proof of our truth lemma is complete.
The main result
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2. The proof proceeds as follows. One direction of the theorem was proved as Corollary 1. In the other direction, assume that Γ ⊆ F orm is consistent. Then, by Lemma 1.1, Γ can be extended to a maxiconsistent ∆. But then consider M = T ree, ✂, Choice, Act, R, E, V , the canonical model defined in Remark. Note that the canonical model used in this proof is universal in the sense that it satisfies every subset of F orm which is consistent relative to Σ.
As an obvious corollary of Theorem 2 we get the compactness property:
Corollary 4. An arbitrary Γ ⊆ F orm is satisfiable in a normal (unirelational) jstit model iff every finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ is satisfiable in a normal (unirelational) jstit model.
The construction of the canonical model defined in Section 4 allows for a generalization. Let us call a constant specification any set CS such that:
• CS ⊆ {c n : . . . c 1 :A | c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ P Const, A an instance of (A0) − (A9)};
• Whenever c n+1 :c n : . . . c 1 :A ∈ CS, then also c n : . . . c 1 :A ∈ CS.
For a given constant specification, we can define the corresponding inference rule R CS as follows: If c n : . . . c 1 :A ∈ CS, infer c n : . . . c 1 :A.
(R CS )
It is easy to see that the least constant specification will be just ∅ and that R3 is in fact R CS where CS is the following constant specification:
{c:A | c ∈ P Const, A an instance of (A0) − (A9)}.
We note that Theorem 2 is accordingly but a particular instance, obtained by setting CS := CS, of the following more general theorem:
Theorem 3. Let CS be a constant specification. Then an arbitrary Γ ⊆ F orm is consistent relative to the axiomatic system Σ CS = {(A0) − (A9), (R1), (R2), (R4), (R CS )} iff Γ is satisfiable in an (unirelational) jstit model satisfying the following additional condition:
(∀c ∈ P Const)(∀m ∈ T ree)({A | c:A ∈ CS} ⊆ E(m, c)).
We further note that the proof of this more general theorem can be obtained from the proof of Theorem 2 above simply by replacing every reference to Σ = Σ CS by a reference to Σ CS . We end this section by the observation that it follows from Theorem 3 that the axiomatization of the validities over the whole unrestricted class of (unirelational) jstit models is given by Σ ∅ = {(A0) − (A9), (R1), (R2), (R4)}.
Conclusion
Building up on an earlier work on jstit formalisms, we have defined stit logic of justification announcements (JA-STIT) -a natural logic which combines justification logic with stit logic to provide a natural environment for representing proving activity of agents within a (somewhat idealized) finite community of researchers. For this logic, we have defined the semantics originally presented in [7] . The main import of this paper is that JA-STIT admits of a strongly complete axiomatization w.r.t. this semantics and that this axiomatization can be straighforwardly accommodated to a wide range of possible constant specifications.
The main result of the present paper also leads to a number of natural questions which we hope to be able to answer in our future publications. One problem is posed by the fact, established in Proposition 1, that JA-STIT is expressive enough to distinguish between the class of all jstit models and the class of all models based on discrete time. This fact implies that our axiomatization will no longer be complete once the time is assumed to be discrete. However, jstit models based on discrete time form a very natural subclass within the class of jstit models, and it would be nice to find out how to axiomatize our logic over this particular subclass.
Another problem for future research is finding a separate axiomatization for the explicit fragment of basic jstit logic. It was mentioned above that even though in JA-STIT one can retrieve explicit proving modalities of this logic, the inverse reduction does not seem to go through, so that in terms of expressive power JA-STIT appears to be a proper extension of the explicit fragment of basic jstit logic. A natural further move would be then to find a separate axiomatization for the explicit fragment of basic jstit logic and compare it to the axiomatization presented in this paper. Yet another natural, although by no means trivial, further move would be to take on board also the implicit version EA of Et-modality and axiomatize the full logic of E-notions.
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